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Statute

of Frauds-NEw

REQUIREMENTS

PURCHASE AGREEMENTS--Schwi'nn v. Griffth,

FOR

ENFORCEABLE

303 N.W.2d 258 (Minn.

1981).
Prior to the passage of the English Act for the Prevention of Frauds
and Perjuries in 1677, transfers of interests in land were not required to
be in writing to be enforceable., Interests in land were transferred by
elaborate livery of seisen ceremonies in which a clod of earth was passed
from grantor to grantee to symbolize the conveyance. 2 One account
states that villagers would gather as witnesses to memorialize the event.
A young man from the nearest village would be forced to view the passing of seisen and be promptly beaten after the ceremony. The beating
3
was supposed to fix the occasion indelibly in the young man's memory.
Just as the beating etched the memory of the young villager, this tale of
punishment vicariously strikes the vision of the ceremony deep into the
memory of the law student. The village boys' reluctance to join in the
festivities and the increased frequency of land transfers prompted the elders to enact the statute of frauds which would memorialize land transfers by means of a written record rather than a writhing one.
Under the English statute of frauds, both actual conveyances of land
and agreements to convey land had to be in writing.4 Most American
jurisdictions adopted the English statute or a variation thereof. 5 Even
1. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 123 (2d ed. 1975); S.
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 488 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1960); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.15, .36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
2. R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 50 (3d ed. 1966); 1 G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 34 (1980).

3. See S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 488.
4. See generally id. § 488.
5. See ALA. CODE § 8-9-2 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.010 (Supp. 1981); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-101, -104, -105 (1962); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1973); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10-108 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-550 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2714 (1974); D.C. CODE ENCYCL.
§ 28-3502 (West 1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.01 (West Supp. 1981); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-401 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 656-1 (1976 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE
§ 9-505 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59, § 2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 32-2-1-1 (West 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.32 (West 1946); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33105 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. § 37 1.010 (Supp. 1982); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2278 (West
1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 51 (1964); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5-103,
-104 (1981); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 259, § I (West 1959); MICH. COMp. LAws

§ 566.106 (1967); MINN. STAT. §§ 513.04, .05 (1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-3-1 (1972);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 432.060 (Vernon 1949); MoNT. CODES ANN. § 30-11-111 (1981); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 36-105 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 111-105 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 506:1 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-2 (1940); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 5-703, -705
(McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22-2 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1335.04, .05 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 136 &
tit. 16, § 4 (West 1972 & Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 41.580 (1979); 33 PA. CONST.
STAT. ANN. § I (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-1-4, 34-11-1 (1969 & Supp. 1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-3-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-101 (1980);
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prior to statehood Minnesota had two statutes of frauds, one pertaining
to conveyances 6 and one pertaining to purchase agreements. 7 The current Minnesota statute of frauds applicable to purchase agreements 8 requires that the,. writing express the consideration supporting the
transaction 9 and that it bear the subscription of the vendor.lO A vendor's
TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 25-5-1, -3,
-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 181 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE §§ 11-1, -2 (1978); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.010 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 36-1-3 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 706.02 (West 1981); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-101 (1977).
Though most states have enacted the statute or a variation, some have merely incorporated it through the adoption of pre-existing common law. New Mexico adopted the
English statute of frauds through the common law rather than legislative enactment. See
Coseboom v. Marshall's Trust, 64 N.M. 170, 326 P.2d 368 (1958). Maryland enacted one
sweeping piece of legislation in 1776 under which all laws protecting citizens of the Commonwealth were continued to protect citizens of the state. See Lewis v. Tapman, 90 Md.
294, 45 A. 459 (1900).
6. Minn. Rev. Stat. (Terr.) ch. 62, §§ 6, 7 (1851) (current version at MINN. STAT.
§ 513.04 (1982)).
7. Id. §§ 8-9 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 513.05 (1982)).
8. MINN. STAT. § 513.05 (1982) reads:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year or for the
sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or
some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing
and subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing; and no such contract, when made
by an agent, shall be entitled to record unless the authority of the agent also be
recorded.
The current statute referring to conveyances reads:
No estate or interest in lands, other than leases for a term not exceeding one
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any manner relating
thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared,
unless by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the parties creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring
the same, or by their lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. This section
shall not affect in any manner the power of a testator in the disposition of his real
estate by will; nor prevent any trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of law.
MINN. STAT. § 513.04 (1982).
9. The consideration as stated in the memorandum need not be faultless, but merely
representative. The terms and subject matter must be set out only with "reasonable certainty." Swallow v. Strong, 83 Minn. 87, 93, 85 N.W. 942, 944 (1901). The Minnesota
Supreme Court stated in Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 38, 134 N.W.2d 887, 890 (1965),
that a purchase agreement which "states expressly or by necessary implication the parties
to the contract, the lands involved, and the general terms and conditions upon which the
sale will be made" adequately fulfills the statute. The consideration actually paid may
differ from that listed in the memorandum if it is not substantially different. Id. at 39, 134
N.W.2d at 890.
10. A signature or signing fulfills the subscription requirement. The signature may be
written or printed and may be placed anywhere on the memorandum, provided it is made
with the apparent intent of authenticating the memorandum. See 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 520-526 (1952); 4 S. WILLISTON,supra note 1, § 585; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF CONTRACTS § 210 (1979); 34 MINN. L. REV. 277, 278 (1950); 16 MINN. L. REV. 325,
326 (1932). But see Ferguson v. Trovaten, 94 Minn. 209, 214, 102 N.W. 373, 376 (1905)
(printed signature does not constitute subscription or signing within statute of frauds).
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agent may fulfill the subscription requirement by signing the agreement."1 Judicial interpretations of the statute of frauds have imposed
additional requirements.12 Because these judicially imposed requirements supplement but do not supplant the statute, they have been tacitly
accepted by the legislature. 13 The public policy which originally supported the creation of the statute of frauds-protection against fraudu14
lent agreements to transfer land-also supports the judicial gloss.
In Schwinn v. Griffith, 15 the latest Minnesota case interpreting the statute of frauds, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the purchase
agreement must be delivered to the vendee and the vendee must accept
the agreement before the agreement becomes enforceable;16 literal compliance with the statute of frauds is no longer sufficient to create an enforceable purchase agreement. 17
The defendant in Schwinn was the successful bidder on a parcel of land
11. MINN. STAT. §§ 513.04, .05 (1982). For text of statutes, see supra note 8.
12. The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the statute of frauds to include an
adequacy of terms requirement that is not literally required by the statute. See Greer v.
Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 506, 253 N.W.2d 133, 139 (1977); Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn.
35, 38, 134 N.W.2d 887, 890 (1965); Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107, 110, 66 N.W.2d
757, 761 (1954); Swallow v. Strong, 83 Minn. 87, 93, 85 N.W. 942, 944 (1901).
13. This follows from the general rule that the court shall look at the object to be
attained when interpreting a statute. See Mankato Citizens Tel. Co. v. Commissioner of
Taxation, 275 Minn. 107, 145 N.W.2d 313 (1966); Farmers & Mechanics Say. Bank of
Minneapolis v. Department of Commerce, 258 Minn. 99, 102 N.W.2d 827 (1960); County
of Hennepin v. County of Houston, 229 Minn. 418, 39 N.W.2d 858 (1949); State v. Industrial Tool & Die Works, Inc., 220 Minn. 591, 21 N.W.2d 31 (1946).
In addition, the court has held that statutes shall not change the common law and are
presumed to be consistent with it. See Phelps v. Benson, 252 Minn. 457, 461, 90 N.W.2d
533, 536 (1958); Application of Shetsky, 239 Minn. 463, 469, 60 N.W.2d 40, 45 (1953).
Finally, MINN. STAT. § 645.17(4) (1982) provides that "[wihen a court of last resort
has construed the language of a law, the legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject
matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language."
14. A classic expression of the policy supporting the statute of frauds was offered in
the 1954 case of Doyle v. Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107, 66 N.W.2d 757 (1954), in which the
court stated:
When we recall the historical fact that the statute of frauds was originally
enacted simply to prevent the frauds to which transfers of land by parol and
livery of seisin lent themselves, we will readily recognize that its basic purpose is
only to provide reasonable safeguards to insure honest dealing and that it was
not enacted to make a fetish of literal statutory compliance or a fetish of requiring a perfect written contract. That adherence to the strict letter of the statute
or perfection in the drafting of written conveyance are not ends in themselves is
illustrated by the equitable doctrine that the statute may not be used as an instrument of fraud and that part performance may, in some instances, place the
transaction wholly outside the statute.
Id. at 110, 66 N.W.2d at 761; see Malevich v. Hakola, 278 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1979);
Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 505, 253 N.W.2d 133, 138-39 (1977).
15. 303 N.W.2d 258 (1981).
16. Id. at 262.
17. Id.
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which had been offered for sale at an auction.I1 The defendant left the
auction grounds before the auction was finished but left a signed blank
earnest-money check with his daughter who had accompanied him. The
plaintiff, who was the conservator of the estate to which the land belonged, and the auctioneer prepared and signed a purchase agreement
after the auction but refused the defendant's check pending his signature
on the agreement.1 9 The defendant subsequently refused to sign the
agreement or pay the earnest money. The plaintiff sued for specific performance of the purchase agreement. The trial court interpreted the
statute of frauds to require that the writing be signed by the party to be
charged. Since the defendant had not signed the agreement, the trial
court dismissed the complaint.20
Although the Schwtnn court did not set forth rules delineating adequate delivery and acceptance of a purchase agreement, it held that the
acceptance and signing of the agreement by an auctioneer was sufficient
to bind a purchaser.2 The supposition is that the vendor and vendee
reached an agreement when the parcel of land was offered at the auction
and the vendee, the highest bidder, offered to purchase the land. A
memorandum prepared later by the vendor and auctioneer merely formalized the bargain and insured that the agreement would fulfill the
requirements of the statute of frauds. The memorandum evidenced the
agreement already made; it did not represent an agreement between the
vendor and the auctioneer to defraud the vendee. 22 The vendee's participation occurred at the time of the bidding and not at the time of the
signing of the written agreement. 23 The vendee could have abandoned
the transaction at any time before the written memorandum was signed
by the auctioneer, because prior to that time the contract was avoidable. 24 A repudiation by the vendee after the memorandum was signed

25
constituted a breach of contract.
The twist in Schwznn was that the writing, which both parties agreed

18. Id. at 260.

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 263.
22. See id. at 262.
23. See id.
24. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted "void" in MINN. STAT.
§ 513.05 (1982) to mean voidable. In a 1951 case involving a personal services contract in
violation of the statute of frauds, the court stated that "it is not morally wrong to make or
keep an oral agreement that falls within the statute of frauds, nor is there any statute

which forbids entering such a contract." Borchardt v. Kulick, 234 Minn. 308, 316, 48
N.W.2d 318, 324 (1951). The agreement, howevr, can be avoided and cannot be enforced.
It is not that no contract ever comes into being, the traditional meaning of "void."

See also

Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 505, 253 N.W.2d 133, 138 (1977); Royal Realty Co. v.
Levin, 244 Minn. 288, 294, 69 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1955). Of course if the contract fully
complies with the statute of frauds, once it is signed it is binding.

25. 303 N.W.2d at 262.
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fulfilled the statute's requirements, was a memorandum of sale that
merely memorialized a parol agreement to purchase the property offered
for bid at the auction.26 At an auction, the auctioneer acts as the agent
of the vendor while auctioning the merchandise or property. 27 When the
auctioneer signs the purchase agreements after the auctioning is complete, he then acts as the agent of the purchaser.28 If the Schwt'nn case
had not involved an auction the agreement would not have been enforced because the vendee had not accepted delivery of the written
purchase agreement. 2 9 When the auctioneer signed the purchase agreement, however, he was acting as the agent of the purchaser and thereby
bound him to the agreement.
Prior to Schwznn the Minnesota court consistently held that in nonauction settings, purchase agreements or memoranda of sale which met
the requirements of the statute of frauds would be enforceable against
either the vendor or the vendee.3 0 The lone exception to the literal requirement of the statute of frauds arose in 1891, when the Minnesota
26. Id. In a case to recover damage on an uncompleted auction sale of land, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a memorandum of purchase prepared by an unsuccessful
bidder prior to the auction and subsequently altered to identify the successful bidder was
not sufficient to comply with statute of frauds. Borough of Lodi v. Fravi Realty Co., 4
N.J. 28, 33, 71 A.2d 333, 335 (1950).
27. Romani v. Harris, 255 Md. 389, 395, 258 A.2d 187, 190 (1969); Wilcher v. McGuire, 537 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Mo. App. Ct. 1976); Dinuba Farmers' Union Packing Co. v.
J.M. Anderson Grocer Co., 193 Mo. App. 236, 238, 182 S.W. 1036, 1038 (1916); Borough
of Lodi v. Fravi Realty Co., 4 N.J. 28, 32, 71 A.2d 333, 335 (1950); Polka v. May, 383 Pa.
80, 83, 118 A.2d 154, 156 (1955); 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 588; RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 212 (1932).
28. 303 N.W.2d at 262. But see Couture v. Lowery, 122 Vt. 239, 168 A.2d 295 (1961).
In Couture, an auction case, the vendors plead the Vermont statute of frauds as an affirmative defense to an action for the specific performance of a land contract. The vendors and
the vendee had a parole agreement for the sale and purchase of a parcel of land. The
memorandum of purchase was not signed by the vendors but was signed by the auctioneer. The vendors and the auctioneer had no written agency agreement, therefore the auctioneer was not properly authorized to act in the vendors' behalf. The Couture court
interpreted the Vermont statute requiring subscription "by the party by whom the sale is
to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing," to require that there
be a written agency agreement between the vendor and the auctioneer. Id. at 244, 168
A.2d at 298. The Schwin court reached the same conclusion, requiring the auctioneer's
agency agreement with the vendor to be of record. 303 N.W.2d at 262 n.7 (citing MINN.
STAT. § 513.05 (1982)). However, the auctioneer's agency agreement with the vendee is
not required to be in writing. Id.
In North Dakota an auctioneer's memo satisfies the statute of frauds as to both vendor and vendee. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 3-05-02, 9-06-06 (1975).
29. 303 N.W.2d at 262.
30. See Radke v. Brenon, 271 Minn. 35, 134 N.W.2d 887 (1965) (vendee enforcing
contract against vendor); Miracle Constr. Co. v. Miller, 251 Minn. 320, 87 N.W.2d 665
(1958) (same); Colstad v. Levine, 243 Minn. 279, 67 N.W.2d 648 (1954) (same); Doyle v.
Wohlrabe, 243 Minn. 107, 66 N.W.2d 757 (1954) (same); Krohn v. Dustin, 142 Minn. 304,
172 N.W. 213 (1919) (same); Gregory Co. v. Shapiro, 125 Minn. 81, 145 N.W. 791 (1914)
(vendor enforcing contract against vendee); Wilson v. Hoy, 120 Minn. 451, 139 N.W. 817
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Supreme Court in Yeager v. Kelsey 3 1 held that purchase agreements must
be signed by both the vendor and the vendee. 3 2 Neither the language of
the 1891 statute 33 or the present statute 34 contains such a requirement.
Yeager was considered an aberration and was overruled in Western Lands
Association v. Banks 35 which, until Schwinn, was the leading case on the
statute of frauds requirements for enforceable purchase agreements.
While Schiwinn does not embrace Yeager's terms, it implicitly assumes its
rationale. More recent opinions in Minnesota and elsewhere have
pondered the problem addressed in Yeager: If compliance with the statute of frauds affords a vendor the privilege of enforcing an agreement
against a silent vendee, the protection provided a vendee under the statute is negligible. 36 Courts in some jurisdictions have faced this problem
squarely by demanding compliance not only with the literal requirements of the statute of frauds, but also with other requirements: That
the vendor must deliver the purchase agreement to the vendee and the
vendee must accept delivery. 37 These additional requirements evidence
the vendee's willingness to be bound by the agreement and assure the
38
mutuality of the contract.
By establishing delivery and acceptance as additional requirements of
the statute of frauds, the Schwinn decision assures mutuality and a greater
degree of fairness in the execution of purchase agreements in Minnesota.
Even a young villager would welcome this painless and equitable addition to the statute.
(1913) (same); Murray v. Nickerson, 90 Minn. 197, 95 N.W. 898 (1903) (vendee enforcing
contract against vendor).
31. 46 Minn. 402, 49 N.W. 199 (1891).
32. See id at 403, 49 N.W. at 199.
33. 1887 Minn. Gen. Laws ch. 41.
34. See supra note 8.
35. 80 Minn. 317, 322, 83 N.W. 192, 194 (1900).
36. See Pierce v. Clarke, 71 Minn. 114, 121, 73 N.W. 522, 523 (1898) (no action shall
be brought upon contracts unless they are in writing and signed by party to be charged);
see also Greer v. Kooiker, 312 Minn. 499, 505-06, 253 N.W.2d 133, 139 (1977) (memorandum of sale and purchase of real estate setting out bases for terms of sale to be later
formalized in formal contract which was signed by vendees and vendors satisfied statute of
frauds). But see Malevich v. Hakola, 278 N.W.2d 541, 544 (Minn. 1979) (vendor must sign
contract for sale of land where vendees able to supply a description of real estate in his
acceptance otherwise opportunity for fraud created especially when vendor intends to sell
only part of tract); cf. Peterson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co., 210 Minn. 449,
453, 299 N.W. 208, 210 (1941) (agreement for purchase of stock by corporation from stockholders not enforceable where letter signed by officers of corporation specifying that
purchase would be made at future date was not signed by stockholders so as to evidence
their agreement to sell).
37. See Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Meuth, 145 Ky. 160, 140 S.W. 157 (1911);
Dinuba Farmers' Union Packing Co. v. J.M. Anderson Grocer Co., 193 Mo. App. 236, 182
S.W. 1036 (1916); Cohen v. Wolgel, 107 Misc. 505, 176 N.Y.S. 764 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919),
af'd, 191 A.D. 883, 180 N.Y.S. 933 (1920).
Wisconsin statutorily requires delivery. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 706.02(q) (West 1981).
38. See 2 A. CORBIN, Surpa note 10, § 510; 4 S. WILLISTON, SUpra note 1, § 579A.
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